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21	OF FINANCE; MICHAEL GENEST,	Action Filed: 6/27/2008
22	DIRECTOR OF FINANCE; STATE	
00	CONTROLLER JOHN CHIANG; and	
23	DOES 1 THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,	
24	Respondents.	
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Finance's Supp. Brief in Opp. to Petition for Writ of Mandate (34-2008-00014476-CU-WM-GDS)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

					•	•	Pa
Introductio	n		***************************************				• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
Procedural	backgrou	ınd					
Facts and la	ts and law relevant to this opposition2						
I.		California's budget process					
, II.	Proce	Process for providing employee compensation increases in the state budget					
•	A.					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
	В.	Budget Ite	em 9800 – f	unding em	ployee compe	nsation increas	es
,	C.	each fisca	al year	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		fund on June 3	
III.	Over	view of emp	oloyee comp	ensation in	n prior and cur	rent fiscal year	s
	A.	Employee	e compensat	tion increas	se provisions i	n fiscal years 2	005-
	В.	year 2008	3 - 2009			n the budget fo	
	C.	Budget fo	or fiscal year	r 2009-201	0		: ••••••
IV.	Pend	ling legislation	on				
Legal stand	lard for a	traditional v	writ of man	date	·		
Legal argu	ment					•••••	••••
I.		and the second s				APS	
	A.	money to	fund the sa	lary increa	ses. Finance h	ine if there wa as already met money	its
•	В.	negotiatio	ons is an exe	ercise of pu	are discretion.	pcoming budge and cannot be	
	•						
II.	Undo chan	er the facts p	oresented by budget	this case t	the court is wit	hout authority	
II.	chan	er the facts p ge the state	budget	this case t	ne court is wit	hout authority	
	chan	er the facts p	presented by budget	this case t	ne court is wit	hout authority	
•	chan	er the facts r	bresented by budget	this case t	ne court is wit	hout authority	
•	chan	er the facts p	bresented by budget	this case t	ne court is wit	hout authority	
	chan	er the facts p	budget	this case t	ne court is wit	hout authority	
	chan	er the facts page the state	budget	this case t	ne court is wit	hout authority	
	chan	er the facts page the state	budget	this case t	ne court is wit	hout authority	
	chan	er the facts page the state	budget	this case 1	ne court is wit	hout authority	
	chan	er the facts page the state	budget	this case 1	ne court is wit	hout authority	
	chan	er the facts page the state	budget	this case 1	ne court is wit	hout authority	

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	<u>Pag</u>
CASES	
Butt v. California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668	
California Ass'n for Health Services at Home (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696	e v. Department of Health Services
Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287	
Carrancho v California Air Resources Boar	
City of Sacramento v. California State Legisl	lature
(1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 393	<i>lature</i> 13
Conlan v. Bonta (2002) 102 Cal App 4th 745	8
•	
County of San Diego v. State of California (2008)164 Cal.App.4th 580	
Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328	of Glendale 12
Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn. v. City of I (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 403	Los Angeles
Humbert v. Dunn	
(1890) 84 Cal. 57	
Mandel v. Myers (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531	passim
	passiii
Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168	
People ex rel. Fund American Companies v.	
Pagalan Kawikar	
	ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

2	(continueu)
3	Rodriguez v. Solis
1	(1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 495
5	Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728
6 7	Tirapelle v. Davis (1993) 20 Cal. App.4th 1317
8	Wallace v. Board of Education of City of Los Angeles (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 611
0	STATUTES
1 2	Civ. Code § 1085
3 4 5	Gov. Code § 13000 et seq
6 7	§ 19826
8	Stats. 2007, Chapter 171, pp. 31, 744-748
0 1	Stats. 2009, Chapter 2, pp. 620-625
2	CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
3	Cal. Const., Article IV, § 10
4	Cal. Const., Article IV, § 12
5	Cal. Const., Article VII
6	OTHER AUTHORITIES
.7	Assem. Bill No. 1781
8.	iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued) **Page** Assem. Bill No. 790.... .7 . 8 . 9

Finance's Supp. Brief in Opp. to Petition for Writ of Mandate (34-2008-00014476-CU-WM-GDS)

· 13

INTRODUCTION

The relief sought by the California Association of Professional Scientists (CAPS) against the Department of Finance and its Director (Finance)¹ in its petition for writ of mandate is both unnecessary and impermissible under the law for the following reasons.

First, CAPS has not identified any ministerial duty that Finance is obligated to perform. Specifically, Finance does not have a ministerial duty to (1) make any determination pursuant to Government Code section 19826 as to whether there are funds in existing appropriations to pay for salary increases or (2) recommend that the Legislature make appropriations for the salary increases in upcoming budget negotiations. CAPS has not cited to a single statute that would obligate Finance to take the actions that the union is requesting.

Second, even if Finance had a "duty" to determine whether there were existing appropriations to pay for the salary increases that CAPS is demanding its member-supervisors receive, Finance has already made a determination that there is no money in the past or current state budgets to pay for any such salary increase.

Third, any recommendation by Finance regarding upcoming budget negotiations is an exercise of discretion, and the exercise of such discretion in a particular manner cannot be compelled by writ of mandate.

Fourth, there is no legal basis for this court to change the state's budget pursuant to *Mandel v. Myers* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531 or *Butt v. California* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, or to take money designated for other employees to permit a salary increase for the scientist supervisors.

In sum, the petition for writ of mandate is without merit and should be denied in its entirety.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 27, 2008, CAPS filed the instant petition for writ of mandate in Sacramento County Superior Court. (Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory Relief (Pet.), at p. 1.) On September 19, 2008, a hearing on the writ was held, during which the court declined to issue a ruling on the merits of the writ and granted CAPS leave to conduct

¹ The State Controller does not take any position on the merits of CAPS' petition and will comply with any and all orders of this Court with regard to any decision issued in this case.

discovery to determine the availability of funds to pay for the salary increase recommended by DPA pursuant to a Government Code section 19826 hearing. (Declaration of Deputy Attorney General Kimberly Graham (DAG Graham Dec.), at ¶ 3.)

Following the hearing, in November and December 2009, CAPS propounded special interrogatories and requests for production of documents upon Finance. (DAG Graham Dec., at ¶ 4.) CAPS also deposed Tim Lynn, the Assistant Program Budget Manager at Finance, and Franklin Marr, who was designated by DPA as the person-most-knowledgeable at DPA regarding state scientist salary recommendations. (*Ibid.*)

On February 13, 2009, CAPS served a "Notice of Second Hearing on Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Declaratory Relief" (Notice). (DAG Graham Dec., at ¶ 5 & ex. 3.)

FACTS AND LAW RELEVANT TO THIS OPPOSITION

I. CALIFORNIA'S BUDGET PROCESS

The Constitution requires that the Governor submit a budget for the ensuing fiscal year to the Legislature by January 10 of each year. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 12, subd. (e).) In addition, the Constitution permits the Governor to require a state agency, officer or employee to furnish whatever information is necessary for the budget's preparation. (*Id.* at subd. (b).) The Governor's proposed budget is introduced as a bill in both the Senate and the Assembly. (*Id.* at subds. (c)(1) & (2).) After the proposed budget has been issued to the Legislature, the Governor may issue a revised budget by no later than April 1 to propose changes to department budgets. (Gov. Code, § 13308, subd. (c).)²

There are two additional instances where Finance may submit changes to the Legislature regarding the proposed budget: (1) proposed adjustments to the Governor's Budget in appropriations for capital outlay, which are due on or before May 1st; and (2) any proposals to reduce expenditures to reflect updated revenue estimates, known as the "May Revise," which is due on or before May 14th of each year. (Gov. Code, § 13308 subds. (c) & (d).) However, neither of these two instances are applicable in this case, and thus it is the April 1st deadline that applies here.

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The Legislature has until midnight on June 15 to pass a budget. (Cal. Const., art. IV, §12, subd. (c)(3).) Once the Governor receives the budget bill from the Legislature, he has 12 days to either sign or veto the bill. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 10, subd. (b)(3).)

PROCESS FOR PROVIDING EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION INCREASES IN THE STATE II.

DPA's Budget Act Log ·A.

As noted above, prior to issuing his proposed budget, the Governor may require a state agency, officer, or employee to furnish information to assist in preparing the budget. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 12, subd. (b).) Accordingly, in the fall prior to the January 10 deadline, the Governor asks DPA to estimate how much money will be needed for compensation increases that have been negotiated through the collective bargaining process, and increases for excluded employees if such increases are ordered by the director of DPA (Deposition of Tim Lynn (Lynn Depo.), attached as Exhibit 2 to Graham Dec., at pp. 10:1-11:8, 11:24-12:13.) The calculated amounts are based upon the employee compensation increases that were agreed to by DPA and employee unions during the collective bargaining process and later approved by the Legislature. (Declaration of Tim Lynn (Lynn Dec.), at ¶ 3.)

DPA's estimated totals are presented to Finance in the form of a "Budget Act Log," which Finance reviews for accuracy and amends in order to include provisions over which DPA does not have responsibility, such as allocations for judicial salaries. (Lynn Depo., at pp. 29:10-30:1, 31:24-32:13.) The "Budget Act Log" is then shared with the Legislature to use as a foundation for determining how much money is needed in the budget for employee compensation increases. (Lynn Depo., at pp. 29:10-30:1.)

The amounts contained on the DPA Budget Act Logs are considered "obligated" money by Finance – that is, money the state is required to pay pursuant to the various memorandums of agreement, side letters, etc., that have been negotiated by DPA and the employee unions and ratified by the Legislature. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 6.)

The Budget Act Logs are important because they provide accountability and certainty that the money the Legislature has appropriated in the state budget is going to be used in a manner

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consistent with current collective bargaining and excluded employee agreements. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 7.) Once a budget is passed, the DPA's "Budget Log" is finalized and, if needed, the log is revised to reflect the final appropriation amounts contained in the state budget. (*Ibid.*)

B. Budget Item 9800 – Funding Employee Compensation Increases

In the state budget, baseline costs for employee compensation are included in individual department budgets. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 8.) However, a different budget item – Budget Item 9800 – is used to appropriate money for employee compensation increases. (*Ibid.*) This includes increases associated with existing or new bargaining agreements³ and cost increases for excluded employees that have received the approval of DPA's Director through a pay letter. (*Ibid.*)

Budget Item 9800 is the only place in the budget where an appropriation for employee compensation increases can be made. Since Fiscal Year 2007-2008, the Legislature has expressly stated that any money used for employee compensation increases must be included in Budget Item 9800 and nowhere else in the budget:

It is the intent of the Legislature that all proposed augmentations for increased employee compensation costs, including, but not limited to, base salary increases, pay increases to bring one group of employees into a pay equity position with another group of public employees, and recruitment and retention differentials, be budgeted and considered on a comprehensive, statewide basis beginning with consideration of the 2008-09 Budget Act. Therefore, the Legislature declares its intent to reject any proposed augmentations that are not included in Item 9800 in the 2008-09 Budget Act, given that this is the item where the funds to implement comprehensive statewide compensation policies, including those adopted pursuant to collective bargaining, are considered. This provision shall not apply to augmentations for increased employee compensation costs resulting from mandatory judicial orders to raise pay for any group of employees or augmentations for increased compensation costs, or approvals for departments to provide increased employee compensation levels, that are included in bills separate from the budget

(See Request for Judicial Notice (RJN), attaching as exhibits 3, 4, and 5, respectively: Stats. 2007, ch. 171, pp. 744-748 [emphasis added]; Stats. 2008, ch. 268, pp. 718-723; and Stats. 2009, ch. 1, pp. 620-625.)

³ For example, many units have contracts that provide for a cost-of-living increase on July 1 of each year, and the estimated cost of this increase is included in Budget Item 9800.

Budget Item 9800 contains three separate provisions – one for each of the three types of funds contained in the appropriation, i.e., general fund, special funds⁴, and non-governmental cost funds⁵. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 9.) The budget bills permit Finance to transfer the money between the special fund and non-governmental cost fund; however, Finance cannot transfer funds to or from the general fund provision. (Lynn Depo., at pp. 17:2-18:4; see also Stats. 2007, ch. 171, pp. 744-748 (attached as Exhibit 3 to RJN); Stats. 2008, ch. 268, pp. 718-723 (attached as Exhibit 4 to RJN); Stats. 2009, ch. 1, pp. 620-625 (attached as Exhibit 5 to RJN).) Consequently, due to this statutory prohibition, Finance is prohibited from transferring funds from the special fund or nongovernmental cost funds of Budget Item 9800 to the general fund provision in order to cover the cost of a salary increase for a particular classification of employees. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 9.)

Finance considers Budget Item 9800 a "pass through" appropriation, meaning that while the money is appropriated by the Legislature to Budget Item 9800 to fund employee compensation increases, Finance will issue executive orders allocating money from Budget Item 9800 to the individual departments who have employees entitled to receive a particular salary increase. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 10.)

The money appropriated by the Legislature in Budget Item 9800 is "obligated" – it is money the state is legally required to pay in accordance with the negotiated agreements made between DPA and the employee unions and excluded employees, as reflected in the DPA Budget Act Logs. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 11.) Employee compensation increases that are not provided for in the Budget Act Logs will not receive funding in Budget Item 9800 unless a bill to amend the Budget Act and increase the Item 9800 appropriation is passed by the Legislature and signed by the Governor. (*Ibid.*)

⁴ A special fund is defined as a fund created by statute, or administratively pursuant to Government Code Section 13306, used to budget and account for taxes, licenses, and fees that are restricted by law for particular activities of the government. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 9.)

⁵ A nongovernmental cost fund is defined as a fund used to budget and account for revenues other than general and special taxes, licenses, and fees or certain other state revenues. Such funds are usually restricted by law for particular activities of government. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 9.)

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C. Reversion of "Left-Over" Money to Originating Fund on June 30 of Each Fiscal Year.

The information provided by DPA for the money needed in a particular year for employee compensation increases is an estimate. For example, employees unexpectedly leave state employment during the course of a fiscal year, and thus the need to fund those employees' compensation increases is no longer required. Consequently, not all of the money that is obligated in Budget Item 9800 is used in a given fiscal year. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 12; see also Lynn Depo., at p. 35:7-22.) However, if there is "left-over" money in Budget Item 9800, it may not be used for an employee compensation increase that is not contained on the Budget Act Log; instead, the money reverts back to the state treasury at the end of the fiscal year to be used for the next fiscal year's budget. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 12; see also See Stats. 2005, ch. 38, pp. 655-657 (attached as Exhibit 1 to RJN); Stats. 2006, ch. 47, pp. 708-712 (attached as Exhibit 2 to RJN); Stats. 2007, ch. 171, pp. 31, 744-748 (attached as Exhibit 3 to RJN); Stats. 2008, ch. 268, pp. 718-723 (attached as Exhibit 4 to RJN); See Stats. 2009, ch. 2, pp. 620-625 (attached as Exhibit 5 to RJN).)

III. OVERVIEW OF EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION IN PRIOR AND CURRENT FISCAL YEARS

A. Employee Compensation Increase Provisions in Fiscal Years 2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008

In fiscal years 2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008, money was appropriated for employee compensation increases through Budget Item 9800. (See Stats. 2005, ch. 38, pp. 655-657 (attached as Exhibit 1 to RJN); Stats. 2006, ch. 47, pp. 708-712 (attached as Exhibit 2 to RJN); Stats. 2007, ch. 171, pp. 31, 744-748 (attached as Exhibit 3 to RJN).) By law, any money that was not allocated through executive orders in prior fiscal years for employee compensation increases reverted to the fund provision (i.e., general fund, special fund, or nongovernmental cost fund) as of June 30th of the applicable fiscal year. (*Ibid.*) Consequently, there are no "left-over" funds from the fiscal years 2005-2006, 2006-2007, and 2007-2008 available for any employee compensation increases for scientist supervisors.

B. Employee Compensation Increase Provisions in the Budget for Fiscal Year 2008-2009

On September 23, 2008, the Governor signed Assembly Bill 1781, which provided the budget for 2008-2009 fiscal year. (Stats. 2008, ch. 268.) In the 2008-2009 State Budget Act; money was appropriated to the three funds in Budget Item 9800 as follows: \$124,111,000 in general fund, \$135,800,000 in special funds, and \$66,886,000 in nongovernmental funds. (See Stats. 2008, ch. 268, § 2.00, pp. 718-723 (attached as Exhibit 4 to RJN).) Because the money appropriated for Budget Item 9800 is based on the needs projections contained in the Budget Act Log, the money is "obligated" for specific purposes. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 11 & ex. 2.) In fact, the "grand total" for employee compensation increases that are permitted for this fiscal year, as reflected in the DPA Budget Act Log, are identical to the appropriation amounts in 2008-2009 State Budget. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 11 & ex. 2; see also Stats. 2008, ch. 268, § 2.00, pp. 718-723 (attached as Exhibit 4 to RJN).)

Following the passage of the state budget, on December 19, 2008, the Governor declared a state fiscal emergency and ordered the Legislature to assemble in special session to address this fiscal emergency. (RJN, at ex. 6.) In response to the Governor's order, the Legislature passed an amended budget for fiscal year 2008-2009 on February 20, 2009. (Stats. 2009, ch. 2.) Not surprisingly, there was no provision in the amended Budget Item 9800 for employee compensation increases. As a result, the amounts listed in the prior paragraph for Budget Item 9800 are still applicable for the remainder of the 2008-2009 fiscal year and are obligated pursuant to the DPA Budget Act Log.

C. Budget for Fiscal Year 2009-2010

While in the special session regarding the budget for fiscal year 2008-2009, the Legislature also passed a budget for fiscal year 2009-2010. (See Stats. 2009, ch. 1.) In the 2009-2010 State Budget Act, very limited amounts of money were appropriated to the three funds in Budget Item 9800 as follows: \$44,533,000 in general funds, \$51,832,000 in special funds, and \$25,529,000 in nongovernmental fund. (See Stats. 2009, ch. 2, pp. 620-625 (attached as Exhibit 5 to RJN).) Again, because the money appropriated for Budget Item 9800 is based on the needs projections contained in the Budget Act Log, the money is "obligated" for specific purposes. (Lynn Dec., at

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¶ 11 & ex. 3.) The amount of employee compensation increases permitted for this fiscal year (amounts for which an appropriation exists) are identical to the amounts requested in the DPA Budget Act Log. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 11 & ex. 3; see also Stats. 2009, ch. 2, pp. 620-625 (attached as Exhibit 5 to RJN).)

In April and May of this year, the Legislature will likely make amendments to the budget for the 2009-2010 fiscal year. (Lynn Dec., at ¶ 13.) However, Finance does not anticipate that there will be any change to the appropriations made in Budget Item 9800, as the amounts that contained in the budget item were already determined by DPA pursuant to agreements negotiated through the collective bargaining process. (*Ibid.*)

IV. PENDING LEGISLATION

CAPS is currently seeking the Legislature's help in obtaining a salary increase for the scientist supervisors in accordance with the recommendations issued by DPA in April 2008. On February 26, 2009, Assembly Member Ira Ruskin introduced Assembly Bill 790 for the purposes of modifying Budget Item 9800 to provide sufficient funds to make the salary determinations at issue in this litigation. (Assem. Bill No. 790 (2009-2010 Reg. Session), attached as Exhibit 7 to RJN.) The bill is expected to be heard in an Assembly committee on March 29, 2009. (*Ibid.*)

LEGAL STANDARD FOR A TRADITIONAL WRIT OF MANDATE

Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a clear, present, and ministerial duty where the petitioner has a beneficial right to performance of that duty. (Carrancho v. California Air Resources Board (2003) 111 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1264-65.) To warrant relief by writ of mandate, a petitioner must demonstrate that the public entity had a ministerial duty to perform, that is, a duty that the entity is required to perform in a prescribed manner without any exercise of judgment or opinion concerning the propriety of the act. (California Ass'n for Health Services at Home v. Department of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal. App. 4th 696, 704).

An action in ordinary mandamus is proper where the claim is that an agency has failed to act as required by law, and it will issue only to compel the performance of an act specially enjoined by law. (Conlan v. Bonta (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 745, 752; Wallace v. Board of

Education of City of Los Angeles (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 611, 616.) Courts have held that if a statute that clearly defines the specific duties or course of conduct that a governing body must take, it creates a ministerial duty and eliminates any element of discretion. (Rodriguez v. Solis (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 495, 504-05; Great Western Sav. & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 403, 413.) "In short, where a statute requires an officer to do a prescribed act on a prescribed contingency, his functions are ministerial." (People ex rel. Fund American Companies v. California Ins. Co. (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 423, 431-432.)

LEGAL ARGUMENT

I. FINANCE HAS NOT SHIRKED A MINISTERIAL DUTY OWED TO CAPS

As stated above, CAPS has failed to meet its burden to establish that Finance has a ministerial duty to perform the acts it is requesting. Specifically, CAPS cannot demonstrate that Finance has a duty to (1) make any determination whether there are funds in existing appropriations to pay for CAPS desired salary increases or (2) recommend that the Legislature make additional appropriations to provide money for CAPS in future budget negotiations.

(Notice, at p. 2:14-16, 21-23.) CAPS cannot identify any statute that requires the Department of Finance to take the actions it demands. On the contrary, the legal pleadings filed by CAPS are completely devoid of a reference to any statute that would create a ministerial duty for Finance to take such actions.

A review of the Government Code provisions that govern the role of the Department of Finance, confirms that there is no ministerial duty for Finance to perform the acts requested by CAPS. (Gov. Code., § 13000 et seq.) Finance's primary responsibility is to "supervis[e] over all matters concerning the financial and business policies of the state." (*Tirapelle v. Davis* (1993) 20 Cal. App.4th 1317, 1320-21.) Finance does not decide how state money is spent; rather, that duty resides exclusively with the Legislature. (*Humbert v. Dunn* (1890) 84 Cal. 57, 58 [noting that the California Constitution's provision "that no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law is intended to secure to the legislative department of the government the exclusive power of deciding how, when, and for what purpose public funds

shall be applied in carrying on the government."].)⁶ The remedy that CAPS seeks may only be obtained from the Legislature by way of an appropriation. (See County of San Diego v. State of California (2008)164 Cal.App.4th 580, 612-13 [stating that Civil Code section 3523, which states "for every wrong there is a remedy . . . does not permit a remedy through the courts when the remedy is with the Legislature."].) CAPS has acknowledged that relief from the Legislature, and not the courts, is proper in this case by seeking legislation to implement DPA's recommended salary increases. (Assem. Bill No. 790 (2009-2010 Reg. Session), attached as Exhibit 7 to RJN.)

A. Even If Finance Had a Responsibility to Determine if there was Money to Fund the Salary Increases, Finance Has Already Met Its Responsibility and Determined that there is No Money.

CAPS has not provided a single reference to a statute or case that obligates Finance to determine whether the salary increases recommended by DPA can be paid from existing appropriations. However, even assuming that Finance has a "generic responsibility[y]" (see Hrg. Trans., at pp. 18:24-19:1) to inform DPA as to the availability of funds to pay the DPA recommended salary increases, that "duty" has already been performed.

In a letter dated May 7, 2008, the Director informed DPA that it was not permitted to make any salary adjustments that would exceed existing appropriations, and that there was no money in

The [DPA] shall establish and adjust salary ranges for each class of position in the state civil service subject to any merit limits contained in Article VII of the California Constitution. The salary range shall be based on the principle that like salaries shall be paid for comparable duties and responsibilities. In establishing or changing these ranges, consideration shall be given to the prevailing rates for comparable service in other public employment and in private business. [DPA] shall make no adjustments that require expenditures in excess of existing appropriations that may be used for salary increase purposes. [DPA] may make a change in salary range retroactive to the date of application of this change.

(Gov. Code, § 19826, subd (a).) This statute applies only to DPA and makes no reference to Finance.

⁶ At the earlier hearing on the petition, CAPS suggested that Finance had a duty pursuant to Government Code section 19826 to determine whether the salary increases recommended by DPA can be paid from existing appropriations. However, this suggestion is completely without merit. To the contrary, the Government Code provision cited by CAPS actually describes *DPA*'s obligations to adjust salaries for public employees:

either the department budgets or the Budget Act Item 9800 to cover the recommended salary adjustments. In other words, by checking to see if any money existed in 9800 that could be used to give CAPS salary increases, Finance checked the only place in the budget that could possibly contain funds that could be used for this purpose.

At the initial hearing on CAPS' instant petition, the Court suggested that Finance had answered the "wrong question" by using the "wrong standard" when responding to DPA's letter of inquiry concerning the availability of funds for the recommended salary increases. (Hrg. Trans., at pp. 19:3-20:1, 23:19-25.) Nevertheless, Finance's response (as detailed in the preceding paragraph) was correct based on the language contained in the budget bills for fiscal years 2008-2009 and 2009-2010. That language states it is the express intent of the Legislature that any and all employee compensation increases must be appropriated through Budget Item 9800. (See Stats. 2008, ch. 268, pp. 718-723; Stats. 2009, ch. 1, pp. 620-625.) Given the language contained in the budget acts, Finance was legally prevented from "looking" anywhere other than Budget Item 9800 for a salary increase for the scientist supervisors.

Moreover, Finance is unable to change the amounts in Budget Item 9800 to provide money for the recommended salary increases for the scientist supervisors. The amounts contained in Budget Item 9800 are *obligated* for certain purposes in accordance with the information contained on the DPA Budget Act Logs. Thus, if there was no provision for a salary increase for the scientist supervisors on the DPA Budget Act Logs for 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 fiscal years, then there was no money that Finance could make available in the Budget Item 9800 for the recommended salary increases. Additionally, the language in the budget bills confirms that in order to receive the recommended salary increases, the scientist supervisors must persuade the Legislature to amend Budget Item 9800. (See Stats. 2008, ch. 268, pp. 718-723 [augmentations to employee compensation permitted if included in bills separate from the Budget Act]; Stats. 2009, ch. 1, pp. 620-625 [same].) Not surprisingly, CAPS has taken this exact approach and found a legislator willing to sponsor a bill to implement the DPA Director's Decision. (See Assem. Bill No. 790 (2009-2010 Reg. Session).)

B. Any Recommendation by Finance Regarding Upcoming Budget Negotiations is an Exercise Of Pure Discretion, and Cannot Be Compelled By Writ of Mandate.

CAPS seeks an order compelling Finance to make a specific recommendation to the Legislature that funding for the salary increases be included in the budget negotiations. This is an improper request for at least two reasons.

First, while mandamus will lie to compel a public official to perform an official act required by law (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085), it may not be used to control an exercise of discretion, i.e., to compel an official to exercise discretion in a particular manner. (*People v. Karriker* (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 763, 774.) Although a court may issue a writ of mandate requiring legislative or executive action to conform to the law, it may not substitute its discretion for that of legislative or executive bodies in matters committed to the discretion of those branches. For example, in *Serrano v. Priest* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, the California Supreme Court noted that "the courts may not order the Legislature or its members to enact or not to enact, or the Governor to sign or not to sign, specific legislation" (*Id.* at p. 751.) Similarly, although a court may order a legislative body to perform a nondiscretionary ministerial act, it may not control an official's discretion. (*Glendale City Employees' Assn., Inc. v. City of Glendale* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 328.)

Here, CAPS' request seeks to force Finance to make a specific "recommendation" to the Legislature. The relief sought would require Finance to exercise its discretion in a particular manner, which, as described above, is contrary to law. Moreover, Finance acts as the advisor to the Governor on fiscal matters. Thus, compelling Finance to make a recommendation that it believes could jeopardize the fragile fiscal state of our current and future budgets would require Finance to abandon its governmental role.

Finance does not have the power to set employee compensation. Instead, "that is a legislative function which ... the Legislature has delegated to the [Department of Personnel Administration]." (*Tirapelle*, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322, fn. 8 (citing Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 189, 193).) "In general, DPA has jurisdiction over the state's financial relationship with its employees, including matters of salary...." (*Tirapelle*, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322.)

Second, a recommendation by Finance will not provide the relief CAPS desires by way of its writ – namely, a substantial salary increase. Assuming, *arguendo*, that Finance did recommend that the salary increases be appropriated in Budget Item 9800, there is no guarantee that the Legislature will comply with Finance's recommendation. Moreover, Finance provides its advice to the Governor, who ultimately makes the decision as to the budget proposal that is made to the Legislature. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 12, subd. (e); see also *Tirapelle v. Davis* (1993) 20 Cal. App.4th 1317, 1320-21 [discussing Finance's role in state government].) This is yet further evidence that Finance has no ministerial duty to make a recommendation to the Legislature as suggested by CAPS.

Consequently, a writ of mandamus to compel any recommendation by Finance to the Legislature regarding the funding of a salary increase for scientist supervisors must be rejected.

II. UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED BY THIS CASE THE COURT IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO CHANGE THE STATE BUDGET.

The Court has suggested that the parties consider whether the court, pursuant to *Mandel v. Myers* (1981) 29 Cal.3d 531 and *Butt v. California* (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, could alter the state budget in order to provide the funding for the salary increases recommended by DPA for scientist supervisors. (Hrg. Trans., at pp. 21:20-22:8.) But, in this case, there is no justification for the exercise of the court's limited authority to change the state budget to provide the salary increases for the following reasons.

specific purpose. (See County of San Diego, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 594 [trial court order that the Legislature appropriate money to satisfy the state's reimbursement obligations through future legislation violated the separation of powers doctrine].) With respect to the budgeting process, case law indicates that the courts must refrain from interfering with the Legislature's decisions unless the action exceeds the scope of the governmental body's authority or is so unreasonable as to be an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. (Carmel Valley Fire Protection Dist. v. State (2001) 25 Cal.4th 287, 300 [denying a writ to compel state to grant fire district's claim for reimbursement because only Legislature is empowered to withdraw funding and suspend state operations].) In fact, City of Sacramento v. California State Legislature (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 393, the Court of Appeal stated that "the broader rule is that mandamus will not lie to compel the Legislature to enact any legislation" and that while "[the] separation of powers does allow for some incidental overlap of function,... judicially compelled enactment of legislation is not an incidental overlap; it is the very exercise of legislative power itself." (Id. at pp. 397, 399.)

First, as noted in the previous argument sections, the language of Budget Item 9800 makes it clear that it is the express intent of the Legislature that any and all employee compensation increases must be appropriated through Budget Item 9800. (See Stats. 2008, ch. 268, pp. 718-723; Stats. 2009, ch. 1, pp. 620-625.) Moreover, the court may not change the amounts of Budget Item 9800 to provide money for the salary increases for the scientist supervisors because that money is obligated for certain purposes pursuant to the DPA Budget Act Log.

Second, because of the legal requirement that all employee compensation increases be appropriated through Budget Item 9800, it is not possible for any other budget item (whether or not there are any available money in those budget items) to be used to fund the recommended salary increases. (See Stats. 2008, ch. 268, pp. 718-723; Stats. 2009, ch. 1, pp. 620-625.) And for this reason, CAPS cannot identify any other budget item that may be used as a funding source to pay for the salary increases.

Third, the facts of *Mandel* do not support the application of its holding in this case. In *Mandel*, a plaintiff was a prevailing party in a lawsuit that included an award of \$25,000 in attorney fees against the defendant state agency. (*Mandel*, *supra*, 29 Cal.3d at p. 537.) The plaintiff twice attempted to collect her fee award by filing a claim with the Board of Control, who approved the claim each time and included the claim amount in bills that were introduced in the Legislature. (*Îd.* at pp. 537-538.) However, each time, the Legislature deleted any appropriation for the claim amount. (*Ibid.*) The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion seeking an order to facilitate payment and enforcement of the attorneys' fee award. (*Ibid.*) The *Mandel* Court ordered payment of the attorneys' fees award paid out of the appropriations made for the state agency in the state's budget, noting that there was a "catch-all" appropriation in the budget that made such money generally available for the payment of legal expenses. (*Id.* at p. 543-545.)

The factual situation in *Mandel* differs dramatically from the facts in this case in the following ways. First, *Mandel* involved a relatively small amount of money that was required to be reimbursed to the plaintiff pursuant to a court judgment. (*Mandel*, *supra*, 29 Cal. 3d. at p. 537, 550-551.) In this case CAPS seeks nearly \$7.6 million dollars in order to increase the salaries for

the scientist supervisors for one fiscal year. (See Declaration of Christopher Voight in Support of Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate (Voight Dec.), at ¶ 11 & ex. C.) The substantial amount of money needed in this case to fund the salary increases would dramatically disrupt the fabric of our state budget and fiscal stability. Second, in Mandel, the state conceded that there were funds to support the court order. (Id., at p. 543.) Here, there is no money in Budget Item 9800 to fund the salary increases. Third, the Mandel Court found there was an historical basis to support the payment of the fees at issue; namely, that there had been numerous occasions where state agencies routinely authorized the payment of court awarded attorneys' fees out of the agency's operating budget. (Id. at p. 544-545.) Whereas in this case, there has been no showing that state agencies can pay for salary increases out of their operating budgets. Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, this case does not involve the enforcement of a court order, as was the case in Mandel. (Id., at p. 537.) Instead, it involves the enforceability of a departmental "recommendation" based on a statute that provides absolutely no direction as to its enforceability or how an employee group is able to obtain funding for a recommended salary increase. For these reasons, the holding in Mandel is not applicable and cannot be utilized to obtain funding for the recommended salary increases.

Much more analogous to the facts of this case is the Supreme Court's holding in *Butt v. California*. (*Butt, supra*, 4 Cal.4th 668.) In *Butt*, the lower court ordered that funds from a school program and the Oakland Unified School District be used to aid another school district. (*Id.*, at pp. 675-677.) The Supreme Court concluded that the lower court erred in approving the diversion of funds from appropriations that were clearly intended by the Legislature to be used for other purposes, and thus not generally available in the manner in which the lower court had ordered. (*Id.*, at pp. 701-702.) The *Butt* Court also noted that the holding in *Mandel* does not permit court-ordered diversion of an appropriation away from a clear, narrow and valid purpose specified by the Legislature. (*Id.*, at p. 700.)

In the instant matter, the holding of *Butt* supports a finding that changing the appropriation in Budget Item 9800 would not be proper. The Legislature has appropriated money to Budget

Item 9800 for a specific purpose – the money needed in order to comply with existing contractual obligations as detailed on the DPA Budget Act Log. Thus, the money is not "generally available" for use by CAPS for the salary increases since they are obligated for other purposes. Additionally, the Legislature has expressly stated its intent that the appropriation in Budget Item 9800 must contain any and all employee compensation increases. (See Stats. 2008, ch. 268, pp. 718-723; Stats. 2009, ch. 1, pp. 620-625.) Thus, the money is not available for any purpose other than that contained in the DPA Budget Act Log.

In short, the facts of this case do not justify the court's use of its limited authority to change the state budget in order to provide the salary increases for the scientist supervisors.

CONCLUSION

CAPS petition fails for four primary reasons. First, CAPS has not identified any ministerial duty that Finance is obligated to perform. Second, even if Finance has a responsibility to determine whether there were existing appropriations to pay for the salary increases that CAPS seeks, Finance has already made a determination and there is no money in the past or current state budgets to pay for the recommended salary increases. Third, any recommendation by Finance regarding upcoming budget negotiations is an exercise of discretion, the exercise of which cannot be compelled by writ of mandate. Fourth, and finally, *Mandel* is inapposite to the facts of this case and the court may not change the state budget to provide the recommended salary increases.

CAPS has not met its burden, despite being given ample opportunity to conduct discovery, of showing that Finance has a ministerial duty to determine if there is money to fund the recommended salary increases made by DPA pursuant to Government Code section 19826, or to recommend that the Legislature provide the increases in future legislation. Moreover, the facts demonstrate that the money contained in Budget Item 9800 is not available to pay for the recommended salary increases – a fact that cannot be rebutted by CAPS.

For all of these reasons, Finance respectfully requests that this Court deny CAPS' petition for writ of mandate in its entirety.

1	Dated: March 26, 2009	Respectfully Submitted,
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Finance's Supp. Brief in Opp. to Petition for Writ of Mandate (34-2008-00014476-CU-WM-GDS)